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LEGAL MISCELLANY.

"A VERDICT DOES NOT BEAR INTEREST PRIOR TO
THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT."
KELSEY vs.

Muapuy, 6 Casey, 340.

One who never heard of this case before he read it in the
Reports, desires to offer some observations upon the principles
therein laid down. A verdi.et was rendered for the plaintiff in
December, 1851, and motions in arrest of judgment and for a new
trial were made, which were overruled, and judgment entered on
the verdict in November, 1852. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania deciled that no interest could be allowed upon the verdict,
for the time intermediate between its rendition and the entry of the
judgment. Is this right? Does it rest on sound principle? Is
it law ?
The principle which underlies all legislation and all judicial decision upon the subject is, that he who detains a debt which he owes
to another, beyond the time fixed in the contract, or inferred from
custom or usage, for its payment, is guilty of a wrong for which he
is justly bound to make compensation; and the legislature determined the amount of compensation when they fixed the rate of
interest. It is difficult to conceive any thing more just and equitable than this. While the debtor detains the mohey and makes
profit out of it, the creditor is deprived of the opportunity of doing
so, and nothing short of compelling the debtor to hand over the
interest he has made, to the creditor who has been prevented making it, cn do complete justice between the parties. If this principle be correct, the debtor should make compensation for the whole
time during which he detains and makes profit out of the money of
the creditor. No act of his, interposing delay by motions in arrest
of judgment or for new trial, should be allowed to benefit him who
*is found to have been in the wrong from the first. No greater encouragement to litigation could be given, than to allow a litigious
defendant to profit by all the delays and obstacles he can interpose
to the payment of his debts. Such is not the notion of justice that
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pervades the legal or the general mind. Interest is always given
as damages for the delay in payment of a just debt. The law, for
wise purposes, has fixed an uniform measure of damages in such
cases, as the injury to the creditor is alike in all. No principle
exists which can warrant the suspension of those damages, which
are in their nature continuous, until the debt be paid. To do so
is to prevent justice, and give to the wrong-doer a premium for his
wrong.
The Supreme Court say, "While the question of indebtedness,
under all the ascertained facts in the case, is under consideration
in the courts, as is the case on a motion for a new trial, the contract
of the debtor is suspended." If by this last expression it is meant
to convey the idea that the creditor has no means to enforce payment of the debt until the suit is determined-and it is fair to
infer that nothing more was intended-then it is difficult to perceive any reason for denying interest in 'the meantime, that would
not also deny it from the commencement of the suit. The whole
time from the beginning to the end of the suit, may just as well be
set down to the account of the "law's delay," as that between the
verdict and judgment. But who ever before, on or off the bench,
ventured to suggest the heretical doctrine that the "law's delay,"
interposed by an obstinate debtor to the payment of a debt found
to be justly due to his creditor, was to be atoned for by the creditor who is in no* default by the loss of interest ? This would indeed be to pervert justice, and bring its administration into contempt. Every suit is presumed to be commenced, prosecuted and
defended for the purpose of determining which party is right, and
which is wrong, as to the question involved, and whoever shall be
found to be in the wrong must bear the expense of the litigation.
The "law's delay" is a sufficiently grievous infliction upon him who
is right, attended, as it is by the expense of his own counsel, without requiring him to leave his funds, unproductive to himself, in the
hands of the wrong-doer, for him to make profit of, and thereby
enable him more vigorously to defend himself against the payment
of a just debt. The final determination of the suit is that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover, and was so entitled when it was
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commenced; and that the defendant was always wrong in refusing
to pay. The "law's delay" is wholly chargeable to the defendant.
The plaintiff should have interest for the whole time, from the
maturity of the debt until payment; and nothing short of this will
consist with justice.
How stands the question upon authority? Interest is allowed
upon obligations for the payment of money, of every sort, from
the maturity thereof until payment. It is allowed upon all settled
accounts, from the time they are settled and the balance ascertained.
It is allowed on all unsettled accounts, in the discretion of the jury,
from the time when they ought to have been settled and the money
paid. It is allowed on awards of referees, whether parol or in
writing, from the time of the award. Jones vs. Bingold, I Yeates,
480; Buckman vs. Davis, 4 Casey, 215. In this last case, considerable time elapsed between the award and the judgment entered
thereon; and the court allowed interest in the meantime, on the
same principle as interest is allowed on a verdict. Baclcman vs.
D.7vis does not seem to have been brought to the notice of the
coart in KLelsey vs. J1.lrp7,y. Interest was allowed on a verdict,
until jifrlgment, after which no question was raised, in Fredenburg
vs. Hallett, 1 Johns. Cas. 27; in The People vs. Gairn, 1 Johns.
Rep. 343; and inLord vs. Te Mayor, &c. of New York, 3 Hill,
430; and in Ball vs. Ketchum, 2 Denio, 188, the same principle
was recognized. There seems to be no exception to this rule where
the delay in entering judgment is caused by the defendant. There
would seem, thus, to be authority sufficient upon which to rest a
decision, the opposite of that announced in Kelsey vs. AHurphy,
and in accordance with the principle already enunciated. Indeed
it appears difficult, upon any well ascertained theory of right and
justice, to conceive how any one could arrive at so unsatisfactory a
conclusion as the Supreme Court have done. The jury can ascertain the amount due only to the rendition of the verdict, and cannot safely compute interest to a later period, for they cannot know
when judgment will be entered. All subsequent delays at the
instance of the defendant must be at the expense of interest on the
ascertained debt from that time. The manner of arriving at it is

